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IV.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)G) (2004).
V.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issues Presented: (1) whether the trial court erred by ruling that there was no
question of fact as to whether a document that did not contain the signature of the
named grantor was on its face and within its four corners clear and unambiguous,
and granted an easement and all rights contained therein; (2) whether the trial court
erred in ruling that the Builder's Statute of Repose (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5
(2002)) applies to bar equitable claims for ejectment, declarative relief and quiet
title; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ruling that a high-pressure natural gas
feeder line that traverses Traveller's property but is otherwise incapable of
providing natural gas or any other tangible benefit to Traveller's property because
of its size and intended purpose constitutes an "improvement" within the meaning
of the Builder's Statute of Repose.
Standard of Review: The first issue on appeal involves a challenge to the
discretionary ruling of the trial court. The standard of review for such challenges
is abuse of discretion. Crookson v. Fire Ins. Exck, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
The second and third issues on appeal involve questions of law. The
standard of appellate review for questions of law following summary judgment is

correctness. Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26,1J9, 995 P.2d 1237. The
trial court's conclusions receive no deference. Id. Moreover, all facts and
reasonable inferences arising from such conclusions are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah 1993).
VI.

GOVERNING AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-10; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5; and Utah Code
Ann. §78-40-1 etseq.
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
This case deals with a high-pressure natural gas feeder line that is owned by

Questar and traverses Traveller's property; and whether said high pressure natural
gas feeder line was properly installed pursuant to a validly granted easement; and
whether said high pressure natural gas feeder line constitutes an "improvement" to
Traveller's property.
On July 26, 2002, Traveller filed a lawsuit, seeking to quiet title to the
disputed portion of the subject property, as well as making claims for immediate
declaratory relief, trespass, private nuisance and ejectment. R. 1-9.
On August 20, 2002, Questar filed an Answer to Traveller's Complaint. R.
13-16.

On October 9, 2002, Questar filed a motion for summary judgment
supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, claiming that all causes of
action in Traveller's Complaint were barred (a) by the Builder's Statute of Repose
as contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5; or (b) by operation of the doctrine of
after-acquired title/estoppel by deed. R. 25-58.
On November 8, 2002, Traveller filed a memorandum in opposition to
Questar's motion for summary judgment and also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, contending as follows: (1) that the Builder's Statute of Repose
had no application to the disposition of the lawsuit because Questar's high pressure
natural gas feeder line was not an "improvement" to Traveller's real property; (2)
that the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed and statute on after-acquired title
had no application to the disposition of the lawsuit because this doctrine and statute
only applied to conveyances of an estate in land and an easement is not an estate in
land;1 and (3) that the previous owners of the subject property never executed the
purported easement document, which rendered the document ineffective to convey
a perpetual interest in the subject property. R. 93-120.
On November 19, 2002, Questar filed a reply memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment; and on November 20, 2002, Questar filed a motion
1

Traveller has not appealed this second argument from its cross-motion for
summary judgment due to the Utah Supreme Court's recent holding in Arnold
Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.2d 721, which followed other jurisdictions in
extending the after-acquired title doctrine to the granting of an easement.

pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that it
could not respond to Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment without first
completing more discovery. R. 122-134, and 145-148.
Traveller filed an opposition memorandum to Questar's Rule 56(f) motion
on December 4, 2002. R. 149-175. On December 6, 2002, Questar filed a reply
memorandum. R. 176-181. On December 12, 2002, the trial court issued an order
continuing Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 184-185.
On January 21, 2003, the trial court heard oral arguments on Questar's
motion for summary judgment. R.

. At this hearing, the trial court agreed to

renew Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment since it dealt with the
converse position of the same arguments addressed in Questar's motion for
summary judgment, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs to assist
the trial court is resolving both motions for summary judgment.
On February 18, 2003, Questar submitted its supplemental brief addressing
"the subject of legislative intent regarding the 'Builder's Statute of Repose,' which
[was] at issue in [Traveller's] Motion. R. 192-503.
2

For some reason the trial court did not number the document entitled "Minutes:
Motion for Summary Judgment" in its files, which was dated January 21, 2003.
This document should follow chronologically between R. 191 and 192. A copy of
this document appears, unnumbered, in volumes 1 and 2 of the trial court's files.
3
Although there is no citation to the Record, examination of the parties'
supplemental briefs and the trial court's order, dated May 5, 2003, clearly reflects
that both motions for summary judgment were argued by the parties at the January
21, 2003 hearing and, thereafter, ruled upon by the trial court.

Also, on February 18, 2003, Traveller submitted its supplemental brief, and
argued that the trial court should not
give effect to [Questar's] proposed definition of the term
'improvement' in the Builder's Statute of Repose because (1) it
[misapplied] legislative intent and [contravened] legislative history;
(2) Utah courts have never applied the term as proposed by [Questar];
and (3) [Questar's] proposed definition would create inherent and
unintended conflicts with other longstanding statutory and common
laws.
R. 504-512.
The trial court convened a hearing on March 6, 2003, to receive additional
oral arguments on the parties' motions for summary judgment. After receiving
oral arguments, the trial court granted Questar's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that the Builder's Statute of Repose barred all causes of action in Traveller's
Complaint and that the doctrine of after-acquired title applied to give Questar an
easement across Traveller's property.4
On April 21, 2003, Traveller filed a request for hearing to clarify the trial
court's March 6, 2003 ruling, as well as an objection to Questar's proposed order
on its motion for summary judgment. R. 513-518. Traveller's primary contention
was that Questar had prepared a proposed order that had Traveller agreeing or

4

Again, for some reason the trial court did not number the document entitled
"Minutes: Motion for Summary Judgment" in its files, which was dated March 6,
2003. This document should follow chronologically between R. 512 and 513. A
copy of this document appears, unnumbered, as the first page in volume 2 of the
trial court's files.

stipulating to the fact that the "Right-of-Way and Easement Grant" document was
on its face and within its four corners clear and unambiguous and that it granted an
easement to "Mountain Fuel Supply Company, its successors and assigns." R.
514.
Questar filed a reply to Traveller's objection to the proposed order on April
25,2003. R. 519-521.
On May 5, 2003, the trial court convened another hearing to clarify its order
on Questar's motion for summary judgment, which clarifications are included
within the text of the trial court's Order on Summary Judgment Dismissing
Complaint with Prejudice and on the Merits. R. 526-538. A copy of the Court's
Order is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2.
On May 21, 2003, Traveller filed its notice of appeal. R. 541-542.
B.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1988, Questar's predecessor utility company, Mountain Fuel

Supply Company (hereinafter "Mountain Fuel"), installed a high-pressure natural
gas utility line through and across certain real property described as the Northeast
Quarter of Section 2, Township 42 South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and the Southeast Quarter of Section 35, Township 42 South, Range 16
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("the subject property"). Mountain Fuel

completed installation of this high-pressure natural gas utility line on or about
December 22, 1988. R. 527.
2.

On December 2, 1988, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess

signed their names to the second page of a document entitled "Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant" below a signature block containing the words "agreed and
warranted," which document purportedly granted Mountain Fuel, its successors
and assigns, a specific right-of-way and easement 22 feet wide to "lay, maintain,
operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipe lines, valves, valve boxes
and other gas transmission and distribution facilities through and across" the
subject property. R. 527.
3.

Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess were not the legal

owners of the subject property on December 2, 1988; rather, the record owners of
the subject property on this date were Progressive Acquisition, Inc., a Nevada
corporation; St. George #5 Partnership; St. George #6 Partnership; St. George #7
Partnership; and Progressive Investment Corporation, a Nevada corporation, as
trustee under a trust agreement dated the 24th day of February 1986, known as
"Red Hills Trust." R. 66-71, 94-95, 98, 109-110, 527.
4.

On August 7, 1989, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess as

beneficiaries in interest under a purchase money trust deed became the owners of
the subject property through a non-judicial foreclosure sale. R. 527.

5.

On February 5, 1992, Mountain Fuel caused the Right-of-Way and

Easement Grant document to be recorded. R. 527.
6.

On September 24, 1992, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess

quit-claimed their interest in the subject property to "Berniece B. Swart, Trustee, or
her successor in trust as Trustee of the R & E Farms Trust under agreement dated
September 17, 1992." R. 528.
7.

On December 31, 1998, Berniece B. Swart, Trustee of the R & E

Farms Trust, conveyed the subject property by warranty deed to Traveller. R. 528.
8.

Neither Questar nor its predecessor-in-interest, Mountain Fuel, have

ever claimed any equitable interest in the subject property, including a prescriptive
easement. R. 528.
9.

Neither Traveller nor Berniece B. Swart, Trustee of the R & E Farms

Trust, have ever granted a written easement to Questar or its predecessor-ininterest, Mountain Fuel, to maintain a high-pressure natural gas utility line across
the subject property. R. 74.
10.

Traveller discovered the existence of the high-pressure natural gas

utility line upon its property in 2002 while it was performing certain excavation
work in furtherance of a commercial real estate development known as the
Tonaquint Center, and requested that Questar remove or relocate the line, which
Questar refused to do. R. 74 and 99.

11.

From the standpoint of a real estate appraiser, the high-pressure

natural gas utility line provides no benefit to Traveller's property because
Traveller's property is served by a natural gas distribution line running under Dixie
Drive, which runs along the opposite side of Traveller's property. R. 86 and 99.
12.

From the standpoint of a real estate appraiser, the high-pressure

natural gas utility line does not fit within the definition of an "improvement" to
real property as that term is commonly referred to by real estate appraisers because
said high-pressure natural gas utility line in no way enhances the value of or
otherwise produces a tangible benefit to Traveller's property. R. 87 and 99.
13.

On or about July 26, 2002, following certain unheeded written

requests to Questar to remove and relocate the high pressure natural gas feeder
line, Traveller filed a lawsuit, seeking to quiet title to the disputed portion of the
subject property, as well as claims for immediate declaratory relief, trespass,
private nuisance and ejectment. R. 1-9.
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Traveller's appeal contains three principal arguments. First, the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Questar's motion for summary judgment amid an
important disputed material fact. The record before the Court of Appeals clearly
reveals that the trial court acknowledged there was a disputed material fact
surrounding the execution of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant document by

the Burgesses through its finding of a "purported" grant, and foreclosed Traveller
from conducting discovery to resolve this disputed fact. Thereafter, the trial court
ruled as a matter of law that the document it previously suggested was ambiguous,
on its face and within its four corners, clearly granted an easement.
Second, the Builder's Statute of Repose does not bar equitable claims for
ejectment, declarative relief and quiet title because the statute was never designed
to eliminate these statutory and common law rights.
Third, a high-pressure natural gas utility line that admittedly provides no
tangible benefit to Traveller's property does not constitute an "improvement"
within the meaning of the Builder's Statute of Repose.
These last two issues present legal questions first impression in Utah
jurisprudence regarding the scope of the Builder's Statute of Repose.
IX-

ARGUMENT

ATHE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING
QUESTAR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY IGNORING A
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT
1.

The Presence of a Dispute as to a Material Fact Disallows the Granting
of a Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part as

follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
U.R.C.P. 56(c) (2004). Conversely, Utah courts have recognized that "the
presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows the granting of a summary
judgment." Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).
When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment,
Utah appellate courts should review the facts "in the light most favorable to the
party opposing a motion for summary judgment." Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City,
2000 UT 26, f2, 995 P.2d 1237. "In reviewing a summary judgment, [appellate
courts] accord no deference to the trial court and review its ruling for correctness."
Id. at ^9. As explained below, the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Questar's motion for summary judgment because it did so despite the existence of
a significant disputed material fact.
2.

There Is a Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Traveller's
Predecessors in Interest Intended to Grant an Easement

When opposing Questar's motion for summary judgment Traveller argued
that it was necessary for the trial court to receive evidence to determine exactly
what Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess intended when they signed their
names below the clause "Agreed and Warranted" on the Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant document on which they were not identified as the named
grantors. See, e.g., Traveller's Request for Hearing.. .and Objection to Defendant's

Proposed Order, R. 514. Examination of this document reveals that the Burgesses'
signatures are affixed to an arguably unrelated portion of this document. A copy of
the Right-of-way and Easement Grant is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1.
Certainly, the terms "agreed" and "warrant" are not customary terms used to grant
an easement, and this language coupled with all of the peculiar facts regarding
ownership of the subject property, including the Burgesses' own lack of ownership
when they signed this document, lend credence to a variety of plausible meanings
regarding the Burgesses' intent. For example, as the beneficiaries of a trust deed
on the subject property it is more likely they were manifesting their intent to
subordinate their security interest in the property to the interest of the intended
easement holder. Yet, as set forth above in the statement of facts, even the named
grantor on this document, "Progressive Investment Corp.," was not the sole owner
of the subject property in December 1988. Rather, it was collectively owned by
Progressive Acquisition, Inc., a Nevada corporation; St. George #5 Partnership; St.
George #6 Partnership; St. George #7 Partnership; and Progressive Investment
Corporation, a Nevada corporation, as trustee under a trust agreement dated the
24th day of February 1986, known as "Red Hills Trust." R. 66-71, 94-95, 98, 109110,527.
For more than a hundred years Utah courts have recognized that "in
construing written instruments, effect is to be given to the instrument or writing as

a whole, though single clauses taken alone [might] give a different construction."
Cereghino v. Wagener, 4 Utah 514, 11 P. 568 (Utah 1886). Arguably, therefore,
Questar has isolated and focused upon the three-word phrase "Agreed and
Warranted" to the complete exclusion of the rest of the document, which identified
a different party as the grantor and intended signatory to the document. To date,
there has been inadequate discovery on these critical factual issues and
consequently there remain significant factual issues for the trier of fact to resolve.
Notwithstanding, examination of the trial court's Order on Summary
Judgment Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice and on the Merits (hereinafter
"Order") reveals that the trial court disregarded this important factual dispute in
reaching its conclusions of law. R. 526-538. In the second paragraph of the trial
court's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts it found as follows:
On December 2, 1988, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess
signed their names to the second page of a document entitled "Rightof-Way and Easement Grant" in a signature block below the words
"agreed and warranted," which document purportedly granted
Mountain Fuel, its successors and assigns, a specific right-of-way and
easement 22 feet wide to "lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect,
protect, remove and replace pipe lines, valves, valve boxes and other
gas transmission and distribution facilities through and across" the
Subject Property.
R. 527 (emphasis added). The act of granting of an easement is a necessary
absolute: it is either granted or it is not. The trial court's determination that the
Burgesses "purportedly" granted an easement necessarily amounts to an

acknowledgement by the trial court that it either made no specific factual finding
on this issue or recognized there was a genuine factual dispute between the parties.
In either case, the trial court ruled improperly.
Notwithstanding, the trial court then made its third factual finding, which
was and is undisputed by the parties and states: "Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth
L. Burgess were not the legal owners of the subject property on December 2, 1988
[when they signed the purported easement document], rather, they were
beneficiaries of a trust deed recorded against the Subject Property." R. 527. If the
trial court was uncertain whether the Burgesses in fact granted an easement to
Mountain Fuel, then this third finding of fact further degrades the trial court's
analytical method.
The foregoing analysis of the trial court's findings of fact reveals that it left
this important factual issue unresolved, and then premised its conclusions of law
upon these seemingly contradictory and disputed issues of material fact. The trial
court should not have considered the applicability of the doctrine of after-acquired
title (codified as Utah Code Ann. §57-1-10) until it first resolved the factual issue
of whether there was a grantor that intended to grant an easement by signing some
document.
In fact, the doctrine of after-acquired title only applies to instances where a
person not vested with title attempts to convey an estate in land or grant a

servitude. The beginning words of the after-acquired title statute read as follows:
"[i]f any person shall hereafter convey..." Utah Code Ann. §57-1-10. These are
action words, suggesting the making, signing and delivery of some instrument. A
copy of the after-acquired title statute is attached hereto as Addendum No. 4. If the
person never intended to make the conveyance of an estate or grant a servitude, or
the instrument was defective, the doctrine would not apply. Yet, examination of
the trial court's analysis of the after-acquired title doctrine reveals that is exactly
what it did when it reasoned "[furthermore, the 'Right-of-Way and Easement
Grant5 document shows that Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess
intended to grant Mountain Fuel and its successors and assigns an easement
and right-of-way according to the terms set forth within the document." R.
535 (emphasis added).
After acknowledging in its second finding of fact that there was a disputed
issue of material fact as to whether the Burgesses intended to grant or in fact did
grant an easement, the trial court then concluded as a matter of law that the
Burgesses "granted the easement," and specifically foreclosed "Traveller from
conducting discovery regarding [the] intent of the Burgesses in signing their
'Right-of-Way and Easement Grant' document." R. 536. In fact, the trial court
specifically noted in the interlineated portion of its Order that Traveller objected to
these conclusions of law.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court abused its discretion when it
determined amid countervailing issues of material fact that the Burgesses intended
to grant an easement. As a result, the Court of Appeals should reverse the trial
court's ruling and remand this matter with instructions that the trier of fact receive
specific evidence on this factual issue before applying the law. See Price Dev. Co.,
2000 UT 26 at ffi[28-29.
B, THE BUILDER'S STATUTE OF REPOSE HAS NO
APPLICATION TO EQUITABLE CLAIMS FOR
EJECTMENT, DECLARATORY RELIEF AND QUIET TITLE
1.

Courts Have a Duty to Interpret Statutes so an Not to Render Related
Statutes Meaningless
When called upon to construe legislative enactments, Utah courts apply

longstanding rules of statutory construction, and their "primary objective in
construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent." Lyon v. Burton,
2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616 (citing Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah
1996)). "The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other
statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Id. (citing Roberts v. Erickson, 851
P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993); Silver v. Auditing Div., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah
1991)); and Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cos., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
Moreover, courts have a "duty to avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that

renders portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless." Id. at fl9, nt. 5
(emphasis added).
The Builder's Statute of Repose (Addendum No. 3) and the quiet title statute
(Addendum No. 5) both concern rights and obligations attendant to real property
and are therefore arguably related. In this instance, Questar's requested application
of the Builder's Statute of Repose and the trial court's ruling render meaningless
the entire chapter of the Utah Code setting forth the process to quiet title to real
property.
2.

The Trial Court's Application of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5 Abrogates
Rights Created by the Legislature Under Utah Code Ann. §78-40-1
Utah Code Ann. §78-40-1 states: "An action may be brought by any person

against another who claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest or
claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such
adverse claim." As drafted, this statute imposes no period of limitation to a
person's ability to quiet title to an estate or right attendant to real property. Only
the running of prescriptive periods, such as in a claim for adverse possession or a
prescriptive easement, or perhaps the related boundary by acquiescence, could
serve to end this legislatively established right. See Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d
1078, 1081 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that the 20-year period to establish a
boundary by acquiescence serves "to make the doctrine function like a formal
statute of limitations" in a quiet title action).

It is well-established in Utah law that "a prescriptive easement is created
when the party claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that 'use of another's
land was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of
twenty years." Nyman v. Anchor Dev., L.L.C., 2003 UT 27,1fl8, 73 P.3d 357
(citing Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254. 1258 (Utah 1998)). Applying the Builder's
Statute of Repose as requested by Questar, and ruled by the trial court, effectively
vested prescriptive rights in Questar that were premature by at least six years when
this lawsuit commenced.
Questar would likely contend that its easement rights vested by virtue of a
specific written grant, i.e., the Right-of-way and Easement Grant. However, such
an argument would miss the point. The operative portion of the trial court's Order
analyzing the Builder's Statute of Repose focused only upon this statute's
perceived bar to all actions—including those seeking to quiet title—and had
nothing to do with whether the Burgesses intended to grant an easement. R. 528533. Thus, the trial court has effectively used a statute of limitations/repose to
create possessory rights in Questar. Following the trial court's analysis to its
logical conclusion reveals that any land owner would be barred from quieting title
to real property after only twelve years when the prescriptive easement claims of
an adverse party are based on said person's installation of improvements on the
subject property. Although equally established through the common law or by

statute, the trial court has similarly eviscerated Traveller's other equitable causes
of action for ejectment and declaratory relief.5 The Utah legislature quite probably
never intended these results when it drafted the Builder's Statute of Repose.
3. There Is No Historical or Case Law Support in Utah for Questar's
Contention that the Builder's Statute of Repose Was Designed to Grant
Possessory Rights to Easements
The Utah Builder's Statute of Repose has existed since 1967, having been
codified in one version or another in the Utah Code as Section 78-12-25.5 until
1999, and as Section 78-12-21.5 from 1999 to the present day. Each amended
version of the statute has been subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the courts,
resulting in many revisions to the statute as various provisions were deemed
unconstitutional or suffered from other legal maladies. Through this process, Utah
courts have made helpful pronouncements as to the proper application of the
Builder's Statute of Repose, which together provide a context for further analysis
of whether the Court of Appeals should allow its application to result in the
creation of a possessory interest in real estate.
First, in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Utah
1989), the Utah Supreme Court recited the history behind the eventual creation of
builder's statutes of repose in most states, including Utah. Historically, English
5

An action in ejectment is an alternative to a quiet title action. Gibson v.
McGurrin, et al, 37 Utah 158, 167, 106 P. 669 (Utah 1910). The right to petition a
court for declaratory relief is governed by statute. See Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 et
seq.

precedent established that claims for improvements to real property required
privity of contract. Id. at 1089 (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842)). Initially, early American courts followed the
English precedent until the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which struck down the privity requirement in
products liability cases. Id. Thereafter, courts around the country began
eliminating the privity requirement as applied to architects. Id. In response to
these and other cases abolishing the privity requirement for other professionals,
including builders and engineers, "the construction industry, through the American
Institute of Architects, the National Society of Professional Engineers, and the
Associated General Contractors, responded with an extensive lobbying campaign
to enact legislation limiting the duration of liability on construction professionals."
Id. Utah enacted its first builder's statute of repose in response to the national tide
of lobbying efforts. Id. at 1090.
Second, the Builder's Statute of Repose was designed to address unsafe
conditions as they affect third parties, or parties for whom there is no contractual
relationship. See, Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224-25 (Utah 1974); see
also, Maackv. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580, nt. 10 (Utah
App. 1994) (stating the Builder's Statute of Repose "expressly applies only to

damages arising out of 'unsafe conditions'"). Obviously, there is no unsafe
condition at issue in the present matter.
Examining the historical perspective around which Utah enacted the
Builder's Statute of Repose, it is clear that it has never been used to create a
possessory interest in real property. On the contrary, this examination reveals that
the statute was designed primarily to provide engineers, architects and contractors
with a period of repose after which they could be relieved from liability.
Moreover, Utah courts' application of the Builder's Statute of Repose has dealt
exclusively with latent construction defects. Clearly no such facts exist in this
case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should take this opportunity to clarify the
proper application and breadth of the Builder's Statute of Repose.
C. QUESTAR'S HIGH PRESSURE NATURAL GAS UTILITY
LINE IS NOT AN "IMPROVEMENT" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE BUILDER'S STATUTE OF REPOSE
1. Not Every Building, Structure, Infrastructure, Road, Utility, or
Other Similar Man-made Change, Addition, Modification, or Alteration to
Real Property Is an "Improvement"
In this case the plain meaning of the term "improvement" and its statutory
definition appear at odds. The plain meaning of the term "improvement" is "a
valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its
condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or
capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it to further

purposes."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

757 (6m ed. 1990). The Builder's Statute of

Repose defines the term as "any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or
other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real
property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (l)(d). While Black's definition of
"improvement" could fit within the definition of the term contained in the Utah
Code, clearly, the Utah Code's definition would not in every case fit within the
definition in Black's because every "building, structure, infrastructure, road,
utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to
real property" does not necessarily enhance the value, beauty or utility of a
property.
A court's "primary objective in construing legislative enactments if to give
effect to the Legislature's underlying intent." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.,
911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (citing West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445,
446 (Utah 1982)). "Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's
plain language." Id. (citing Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038
(Utah 1989)). Moreover, Utah courts have reasoned that "[considering] the basic
reasonableness of [the courts'] interpretation of [a] statute" is an "appropriate
double-check on the interpretation [they] conclude emerges from a straightforward
reading of the statute's plain language." Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd,
949 P.2d 779, 783 (Utah App. 1997). "It is axiomatic that a statute should be

given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend
an absurd or unreasonable result." Id (citing State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310,
313 (Utah 1988)).
Respectfully speaking, however, the trial court achieved a legally "absurd or
unreasonable result" in adopting Questar's argument that its high pressure natural
gas feeder line is an "improvement" to Traveller's property. As explained above in
the statement of facts, Questar's high pressure natural gas feeder line is a main
feeder line, and because of its size, construction and intended purpose, it has no
ability to provide natural gas to Traveller's property. R. 59, 86, 87 and 99.
Additionally, the high pressure natural gas feeder line adds no value to Traveller's
property and actually reduces its commercial utility because the line is impeding
development. R. 86, 87 and 99. Therefore, under the most logical analysis it is not
an improvement to Traveller's property.
2. Utah Courts Have Implied that There May Be Instances when the Plain
Meanings of the Key Terms within the Builder's Statute of Repose Are
Unreasonable
Most Utah cases discussing the Builder's Statute of Repose concern
challenges to the constitutionality of the statute or the applicability of a discovery
rule. Traveller is aware of only one Utah case that examined the plain meaning of
some of the key terms within the Builder's Statute of Repose, although
unfortunately the plain meaning of the term "improvement" was not one of them.

However, this case provides some helpful guidance for how the Court of Appeals
should address Traveller's contention that Questar's high pressure natural gas
feeder line in not an "improvement" to Traveller's property.
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 2003 UT App 367,
ffl[2 and 10, 78 P.3d 995, the Court of Appeals examined the issue of whether a
developer's act of determining boundaries, size, location, and placement of lands
on a plat made the developer a "provider" performing an "activity in relation to an
'improvement.'" Some of the lots identified on this plat were in an avalanche
zone, and years later a home that was constructed in the avalanche zone was
destroyed by an avalanche. Id. at \2. The trial court determined that the developer
was a "provider," which had the effect of time-barring the insurance company
subrogee's claims against the developer. Id. at ^[3.
In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant the developer's motion for
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals first acknowledged the statutory
definitions of the terms "provider" and "improvement." Id. at \1. The Court of
Appeals then observed as follows:
The trial court ruled that the activities of [the developer], in relation to
Lot 2, were an improvement to real property because "after
extensively reviewing the statute of repose as it existed in 1997, and
the Supreme Court's holding in Craftsman, the [trial] court finds that
the legislature included—within the statutory definition of
'improvement'—a developer's activities in relation to subdividing
raw land.

Id. at f 8. This observation is important because the Court of Appeals followed
with a clarification that
Craftsman never addressed the definition of an improvement to real
property, let alone the issue of whether site selection and subdivision
of raw land are improvements to real property. Accordingly, it was
inappropriate for the trial court to rely upon Craftsman for that
proposition.
Id. at Tf9. The Court of Appeals then reasoned:
In this case we need not go beyond the plain language of the statute.
Here, it is undisputed that the activities of [the developer] did not
constitute a "building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other
similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real
property."
Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5(l)(c) (Supp. 1997)). This language by the
Court of Appeals clearly implies that there will be cases when a court must look
beyond the plain language of the key terms in the Builder's Statute of Repose.
In Andrus v. Alfred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965), the
Utah Supreme Court reasoned as follows regarding proper statutory construction:
Allowance should be made for the fact that statutes are necessarily
stated in general terms, and that often there is neither the prescience to
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of language to cover with exactitude,
all of the exigencies of life which may arise. For this reason one of the
fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should
be looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it was
intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to
accomplish that objective. In order to give the statute the
implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness.

In this instance, the trial court succumbed to the over-application of "technical
literalness"; Questar's high pressure natural gas feeder line is simply not an
"improvement" to Traveller's property within the meaning of the Builder's Statute
of Repose.
3. Court's in Other Jurisdictions Interpreting Statutes of Repose Have
Applied a Common Sense Analysis and Reasoned that Similar
Structures Are Not "Improvements to Real Property"
In most instances state and federal legislative bodies are incapable of
divining every conceivable factual scenario to which a particular statute may be
applied. The many revisions to Utah's Builder's Statute of Repose and the facts of
the present controversy serve to illustrate this point. Fortunately, however, courts
in other jurisdictions have examined similar builder's statutes of repose to
determine whether some structure that admittedly provides no tangible benefit to
particular real property should because of an overbroad definition in a statute be
classified as an "improvement."
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions utilize a common sense
approach to reconcile this inevitable contradiction in builder's statutes of repose
between plain meaning and reality. Gerald W. Heller, Article: The District of
Columbia's Architects' and Buildings' Statute of Repose: Its Application and Need
for Amendment, 34 Cath. U.L. Rev. 919, 931-934 (1985). "The relevant inquiry in
this test centers upon whether the object is an 'improvement' pursuant to the

common usage or literal meaning of the term." Id. at 932. Courts applying the
common sense approach have "buttress [ed] their conclusions" by examining the
"degree of annexation and physical size of an object" contemplated as an
improvement to real property. Id. at 934. As its hallmark, "the common sense
approach provides a flexible analytical framework that can accommodate the facts
of a particular situation." Id.
Admittedly, the District of Columbia's builder's statute of repose critiqued
by Mr. Heller (D.C. Code Ann. § 12-310 (1981 & Supp. 1985)) differs from Utah's
Builder's Statute of Repose. Most notably, unlike Utah's statute, the District of
Columbia's statute did not define the term "improvement." However, as the facts
of the present controversy clearly illustrate, there are instances where a
legislature's best efforts to define a term prove unworkable and unreasonable.
Traveller contends that in such instances Utah courts should apply a common sense
analysis.
Many jurisdictions examining facts similar to the present controversy have
reasoned that a device such as Questar's high pressure natural gas utility line,
which admittedly provides no tangible benefits to Traveller's property, is not an
"improvement to real property" within the meaning or purpose of such
jurisdictions' builder's statutes of repose or limitations. For example, in Johnson
v. Steele-Waseca Coop. Elec, 469 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Minn. App. 1991), the Court

of Appeals of Minnesota considered whether electrical distribution equipment
installed on a landowner's property but owned by the electric utility was an
"improvement to real property" under Minn. Stat § 541.051.
In this case, the appellants operated a dairy farm and in 1980 built a new
barn and had respondent, the local power distributor, install new electrical
equipment and wiring to the barn. Id. The utility also installed a center pole and
transformer to bring power to the farm, Id. Shortly after appellants transferred
cattle to the new barn, they began noticing problems with the herd, which was
eventually attributed to stray voltage from the new transformer. Id. In 1989, the
dairy brought suit against the electric utility for breach of contract, negligence,
nuisance and strict liability. Id. The trial court determined that the pole and
transformer constituted improvements to the dairy's property and dismissed the
dairy's case based upon the bar of Minnesota's various statutes of limitations. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota reversed the trial court and
observed that courts umust use a 'common sense analysis' to determine in each
case what is an improvement to real estate." Id. at 519. Furthermore, the
Minnesota court reasoned that
[u]nlike earlier cases involving improvements attached to buildings,
here respondents installed an electric pole and transformer which
stands independently on appellant's property as serves the distribution
purposes of the cooperative. This equipment enables respondent to
increase its electric service to appellant's farm. Rather than being an

improvement to appellant's property, this equipment is an addition to
respondent's distribution system.
Id.
In Turner v. Marable-Pirkle, Inc., 233 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ga. 1977), the
Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether an electric utility's conversion of a
utility pole to increase distribution capabilities constituted an improvement to real
property. The plaintiff received serious personal injuries in April of 1973 when a
roto-tiller he was operating upon his property came into contact with an energized
ground wire running from a utility pole that was owned by the city. Id. The
plaintiff sued the city and electric utility. Id.
In 1964, the electric utility was employed by the city to convert the city's
electrical distribution system to a higher voltage system, which required the
replacement of every transformer in the city's system. Id. After the plaintiff filed
his lawsuit, the electric utility filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that
the action was time-barred pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 3-1006 (1968). Id. The
1968 statute provided that
no action to recover damages for any deficiency in the ... construction
of an improvement to real property ... shall be brought against any
person performing the construction of such an improvement more
than eight years after substantial completion of such an improvement.
Id. (citing Ga. Code. Ann. § 3-1006 (1968)). The trial court granted summary
judgment to the electric utility. Id.

In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court of Georgia
stated as follows:
The erection of a power pole, and the placing of the necessary
equipment thereon, for the transmission of electricity is not such an
improvement to real estate as was contemplated by the 1968 statute.
And, as in this case, the mere changing or replacement of such
equipment on a pole already erected is not an improvement to realty
pursuant to this statute. Therefore, the statute simply is not applicable
in this case; it does not constitute a bar to the plaintiffs action; and
the trial court committed error in granting summary judgment and
dismissing [the electric utility] as a party defendant.
Id. at 775; accord Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. City of Atlanta, et al, 287 S.E.2d 229,
232 (Ga. App. 1981) (clarifying that the Georgia statute "applies regardless of
when the injury occurs or, indeed, whether a cause of action has accrued at all prior
to the expiration of the period"; and holding that installation of a natural gas
transmission line did not constitute an "improvement to real property" within the
meaning of Ga. Code. Ann. § 3-1006 (1968)).
By citing the above cases Traveller does not intend to imply that natural gas
lines may not ever be properly classified as improvements to real property within
the meaning of a builder's statute of repose. Indeed, courts in a few jurisdictions
have recognized that natural gas lines were an improvement to real property. See,
e.g., Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 508 (8th Cir.
1983) (interpreting South Dakota law); Ebert v. South Jersey Gas Co., 723 A.2d
599 (NJ. 1999). However, in each of these cases the gas lines at issue physically

connected to homes or other improvements located upon the real property. Van
Den Hul 716 F.2d at 507; Ebert, 723 A.2d at 600. Clearly, this is not the case
with Questar's natural gas line.
Based on the foregoing analysis of other jurisdictions' treatment of this
issue, the Utah Court of Appeals should apply a common sense analysis and
determine that Questar's high pressure natural gas feeder line is not an
improvement to Traveller's property and, therefore, the Builder's Statute of
Repose does not bar any of the causes of action in Questar's Complaint.
X.

CONCLUSION

Traveller respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals clarify the scope of
the Builder's Statute of Repose by ruling that the statute does not bar equitable
claims for ejectment, declarative relief and quiet title; and also by ruling that
because Questar's high-pressure natural gas utility line provides no tangible benefit
to Traveller's property that it is not an "improvement" within the meaning of the
Builder's Statute of Repose. Lastly, Traveller requests that the Court of Appeals
rule that there was a disputed issue of material fact regarding the Burgesses'
execution of the Right-of Way and Easement Grant and so the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Questar's motion for summary judgment. After so ruling,
Traveller requests that the Court of Appeals remand this case to the trial court with
instructions to reinstate all causes of action in Traveller's Complaint, as well as its

argued but unpled cause of action to quiet title, and take further evidence and
reserve for the trier of fact the issue of the Burgesses' intent regarding the Rightof-Way and Easement Grant.
Respectfully submitted this / Z ^ day of August, 2004.
SNOW JENSEN & REECE
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM NO. 1:

RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT

ADDENDUM NO. 2:

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
AND ON THE MERITS

ADDENDUM NO. 3:

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-21.5

ADDENDUM NO. 4:

UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-10

ADDENDUM NO. 5:

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-40-1

Tabl

RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT

PROGRESSIVE INVESTMENT CORP., a Nevada corporation, Trustee
,
Grantor, do(es) hereby convey and warrant to MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a
Corporation of the State of Utah, Grantee, its successors and assigns, for the
sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) and other good and valuable considerations, receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, a right-of-way and easement
22,0
feet in
width to lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace
pipe lines, valves, valve boxes and other gas transmission and distribution
facilities (hereinafter collectively called "facilities") through and across the
following described land and premises situated in the County of
Washington ,
State of Utah, to-wit:
Land of the Grantor located in the Northeast Quarter of Section 2,
Township 43 South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and the
Southeast Quarter of Section 35, Township 42 South, Range 16 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian;

EXHIBIT

the center line of said right-of-way and easement shall extend through and
across the above described land and premises as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point South 0°22'25M East 652.67 feet along the section
line from the Northeast Corner of said Section 2; running thence North
63°57'51M West 1256.18 feet; thence North I'Dl^OO" West 214.92 feet;
thence North 10°34'01" East 104.29 feet; thence North 8°12,13M West
167.39 feet; thence North 1°01,00" West 745-10 feet; thence North
52°35'37M East 249.08 feet; thence North 34°40t41M East 324.06 feet,
more or less, to Grantor's Northeast property line.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
its successors and assigns, so long as such facilities shall be maintained,
with the right of ingress and egress to and from said right-of-way to maintain,
operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace the same.
During
temporary periods Grantee may use such portion of the property along and
adjacent to said right-of-way as may be reasonably necessary in connection with
construction, maintenance, repair, removal or replacement of the facilities.
The said Grantor(s) shall have the right to use the said premises except for the
purposes for which this right-of-way and easement is granted to the said
Grantee, provided such use does not interfere with the facilities or any other
rights granted to the Grantee hereunder.
If the facilities are installed at any point within a roadway or any point
that may be construed to be a road right-of-way, said installation is for
Grantee's convenience and shall not constitute an admission by Grantor(s) that
said right-of-way is available for public use.
The Grantor(s) shall not build or construct nor permit to be built or
constructed any building or other improvement except curb, gutter, driveways,
roadways, sidewalks, parking lots, landscaping, sprinkling systems or similar
improvements over or across said right-of-way, nor change the contour thereof
without written consent of Grantee. This right-of-way shall be binding upon and
inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of Grantor (s) and the
successors and assigns of the Grantee, and may be assigned in whole or in part
by Grantee,
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It is hereby understood that any parties securing this grant on behalf of
the Grantee are without authority to make any representations, covenants or
agreements not herein expressed.
WITNESS the execution hereof this

day of
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PROGRESSIVE INVESTMENT CORP., a Nevada
Corporation, Trustee

Bradley A. Erickson, President

AGREED and WARRANTED:

Rodney Qj Burgess

/

Elizabeth L. Burgess (J

STATE OF HAWAII

)
) ss.

County of

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
jiay of
, 1988, by Bradley A. Erickson, President of
Progressive Investment Coip., a Nevada corpoiation, Trustee.
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing at

STATE OF UTAH
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) ss.
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County of
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foregoing
,*7V
•egoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ___^_______
day of
, 1988, by Rodney C Burgess and Elizabeth L.
Burgess.
My Commission Expires:

/Notary P u b l i c / 0 , 7

;j.\

Residing at
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Russell S. Mitchell (USB #6938)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A
St. George, Utah 84770-3041
Telephone: (435) 628-1627
Fax: (435)628-5225

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAY H. TRAVELLER INVESTMENTS,
L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company,

v.

ORDER ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
AND ON THE MERITS

QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. 020501454

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge James L. Shumate

This matter came before the Court on January 21, 2003, at the time set for Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and based on arguments presented at that time before the Court,
both parties prepared supplemental briefs and oral argument was continued to and heard on March
6,2003, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff Kay H. Traveller Investments, L.L.C. ("Traveller") was represented
by V. Lowry Snow of Snow, Jensen & Reece. Defendant Questar Gas Company ("Questar") was
represented by Russell S. Mitchell of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. The Court
having heard oral arguments, and having read all of the relevant pleadings and all exhibits attached

thereto, case law, and Utah statutes regarding the same, concludes that there are no genuine issues
of material fact.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On December 22, 1988, Questar's predecessor utility company, Mountain Fuel

Supply Company, installed a high-pressure natural gas utility line through and across certain real
property described as the Northeast Quarter of Section 2, Township 42 South, Range 16 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and the Southeast Quarter of Section 35, Township 42 South, Range 16
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Subject Property").
2.

On December 2, 1988, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess signed their

names to the second page of a document entitled "Right-of-Way and Easement Grant" in a signature
block below the words "agreed and warranted," which document purportedly granted Mountain Fuel,
its successors and assigns, a specific right-of-way and easement 22 feet wide to "lay, maintain,
operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipe lines, valves, valve boxes and other gas
transmission and distribution facilities through and across" the Subject Property.
3.

Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess were not the legal owners of the

Subject Property on December 2, 1988, rather, they were beneficiaries of a trust deed recorded
against the Subject Property.
4.

On August 7, 1989, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess became the

owners of the Subject Property through a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale.
5.

On February 5,1992, Mountain Fuel caused to be recorded the Right-of-Way and

Easement Grant document.

?

6.

On September 24,1992, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess quit-claimed

their interest in the Subject Property to "Berniece B. Swart, Tmstee, or her successor in trust as
Trustee of the R & E Farms Trust under agreement dated September 17, 1992."
7.

On December 31, 1998, Berniece B. Swart, Trustee of the R&E Farms Trust,

conveyed the Subj ect Property by Warranty Deed to K. H. Traveller Investments, LLC, specifically
subject to "Easements, Rights of Way and Restrictions of Record."
8.

Traveller filed its Complaint in this matter on July 26, 2002.

9.

Neither Questar nor its predecessor in interest, Mountain Fuel, has claimed a

prescriptive easement in the Subject Property.
ANALYSIS
Questar's Motion for Summary Judgment has two basic grounds: that all claims are barred
by the statute of limitations and repose located at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5, and that the "Rightof-Way and Easement Grant" is a valid conveyance of an easement under the doctrine of afteracquired title ("estoppel by deed"). The Court grants Questar's Motion on both grounds for reasons
set forth below.
A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - REPOSE
The Utah State Legislature has enacted specific legislation to bar all claims against manmade

alterations to real property after a certain number of years have passed, which is now commonly
referred to as the "Builder's Statute of Repose." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(3)(b) states:
All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years
from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon
which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before
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completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year
period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
In addition to this two-year statute of limitations, there is a cutoff period of twelve years from the
time the improvement is completed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(4) states:
Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against
a provider more than 12 years after completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. In the event the cause of action is discovered or
discoverable in the eleventh or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the injured
person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action.
In the case at hand, Mountain Fuel was a "provider" in that it did construct a manmade
natural gas high-pressure utility underground pipeline across portions of the Subject Property. This
pipeline altered the Subject Property, istmanmade, is a utility, and therefore fits the definition of
"improvement" under the statute. Traveller's arguments to the contrary are without merit. This
improvement was completed onDecember22,1988, and Mountain Fuel recorded the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant on February 5, 1991, thereby giving notice to the world of its existence. "A
recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission
in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment" Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2.
All of the causes of action set forth in Traveller5 s Complaint fit within the statutory definition
of "action" because the definition includes "any claim" for relief regardless which legal theory the
claim is based on, as it includes the all-inclusive "other source of law." In addition to the claims pled
in Traveller's complaint, during oral argument Traveller argued extensively regarding the theory of
quiet title, asserting that the relief it sought was basically a request to quiet title in its favor to the
disputed Subject Property. Whether Traveller wishes to rely on the statutory sources of law of quiet
title or declaratory relief, equitable relief of ejectment, tort relief of trespass and nuisance, all of
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Traveller's causes of action are related to this improvement on the Subject Property. Because these
causes of action and the improvement fit squarely within the statutory definition, Utah's "Builder's
Statute of Repose" applies directly to this case.
Traveller's attempts to construe a contrary meaning of the statutory language through
affidavits is without merit. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is a matter of law for the
Court to decide the meaning of the words used in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 and is not subject
to the testimony of various fact or expert witnesses. See Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, \ 8, 52
P.3d 1252 ("Additionally, because the paramount issue in this case is a question of statutory
construction, it is a question of law that we review for correctness."); Brixen & Christopher
\

Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, If 15,29 P.3d 650 ("Moreover, 'the interpretation must
be based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform with an
intention not expressed.5") (citations omitted).
Furthermore, in construing statutes, the Court must approach the interpretation of the words
used in the statute with the understanding that the Legislature used each word and combination of
words intentionally and should not substitute any other definition or meanings for words that are
defined by the Legislature.
"We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Furthermore,
"courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has
no power to rewrite the statute to confirm to an intention not expressed."
C. T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, \ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (citations omitted).
It is the Legislature's prerogative to modify a term by expanding or limiting its definition.
Once the Legislature sets the definition, the Court has no authority to rewrite the definition to assign

it a different meaning. See Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, H 17, 44 P.3d 767 ("hi
interpreting this language, the court of appeals should not have relied on the case law of other
jurisdictions, but instead on the definition provided by the Salt Lake City Council.")
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that where a defined term is used differently in
different statutes, the term can have distinctly different meanings. See O'Keefe v. Utah State
Retirement Bd„ 956 P.2d 279, 282 n. 3 (Utah 1998) ("Although it is certainly true that the FLSA
governs when Ogden City must pay its peace officers overtime compensation, the FLSA does not
define overtime for the purposes of the PSRA, nor does it change the usually accepted meaning of
the term to hours worked in excess of 43 per week.")
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(4), all claims are barred after twelve years of the
date the improvement is completed. Since the improvement was completed on December 22,1988,
any claims to be made against Mountain Fuel or Questar should have been made by December 22,
2000. Because Traveller received the property by warranty deed on December 31,1998, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-21.5(3)(b) provided Traveller two years from December 31, 1998, to bring its
complaint against Questar. However, in the case at hand, Traveller filed its Complaint on July 26,
2002, approximately 19 months past the deadline.
Traveller claims that because the Legislature did not clearly and specifically state that Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 would apply to the specific facts and circumstances in the case at hand (i.e.,
quiet title and trespass), the Legislature could not have intended for the statute to apply in this case,
and therefore that the Court should not apply this statute. Traveller has argued that the Court must
thoroughly analyze the legislative history surrounding the passage of this statute in order to
determine the legislative intent. Traveller claims that the intent of the Legislature was to limit the
6

statute to only those claims arising out of defective design and construction. However, Utah law is
clear on the issue of when it is appropriate to analyze the legislative history of a statute to determine
the legislative intent. Although there are appropriate times for the courts to scrutinize the legislative
history and floor debates, etc., to determine the intent of the Legislature in passing certain statutes,
this is not one of those times.
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT
134, f 19, 464 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, that it is not always proper to analyze legislative history, stating:
Plaintiffs' contention that the statute's legislative history evidences that the
statute's purpose is to prevent or hinder abortions is unavailing as we need not
examine the legislative history of this statute to discover the legislative intent.
"When examining a statute, we look first to its plain language as the best
indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute." Wilson
v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998). Legislators may
decide that a statute should be passed for myriad, often even different, reasons,
but where the legislative purpose is expressly stated and agreed to as part of the
legislation, we do not look to the views expressed by one or more legislators
in floor debates, committee minutes, or elsewhere, in determining the intent of
the statute.
In the case at hand, the legislative purpose is expressly stated within the legislation that was passed.
That legislative intent is located in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(2), which states as follows:
(2)

The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions,
or breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly
remote and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the
citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records
storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider
and an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many years
after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and
unexpected ten years following completion or abandonment;
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(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the
citizens of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in
this chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider arising out of or
related to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement.
The Legislature, in passing this legislation, has expressly stated that its purpose is to impose
a period of limitation and repose upon all causes of action related to the installation of the
improvement. This is done without any limitation as to types of actions, such as for defects in
constructions or latent defects in construction or design. Because of this express statement regarding
intent and purpose of the Legislature, the statute must be interpreted without regard to legislative
history.
However, this Court has examined the legislative history, including the minutes from floor
debates, interim committee notes, and other documents produced by the Legislature when dealing
with this statute, which were supplied by the parties in their supplemental memoranda. The Court
still reaches the conclusion that the Legislature's intent was that this statute has a comprehensive
application, and that this statute would apply to all claims and causes of action that could be brought
against a provider arising out of the installation of an improvement to real property, as those terms
are defined in the statute.
Because Traveller failed to bring any claims within the two years after it knew or should have
known about the pipeline and easement, and because the twelve years have run since the pipeline
construction across the Subj ect Property was completed, Traveller is barred from bringing any cause
of action for any claim of relief related to Questar's pipeline, including trespass, ejectment, quiet
title, or any other equitable action to secure superior rights of title and possession.
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B.

AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess specifically warranted a conveyance of a

commercial easement in gross to Mountain Fuel for construction of the high-pressure natural gas
utility underground pipeline across the Subject Property. Based on the equitable doctrine of afteracquired title as recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, the Burgesses and any of their assigns or
grantees are thereby estopped from disclaiming this conveyance of interest. After-acquired title is
the equitable theory whereby a grantor who does not have title at the time of the conveyance but who
subsequently acquires title is estopped from denying that he had title at the time of the transfer and
such after-acquired title inures to the benefit of the grantee or his successors.
As applied to the case at hand, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess warranted the
conveyance of a specific interest - a 22-foot-wide commercial easement in gross across the Subject
Property at a time they did not have title to the Subject Property. Later, the Burgesses became the
owners of the Subject Property through the conveyance of a Trustee's Deed upon sale. Therefore,
the Burgesses, once they acquired the title of the Subject Property, are estopped from denying this
conveyance by claiming that they did not have title at the time they signed the Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant. Those who acquire title from the Burgesses cannot acquire any more right or
interest to the Subject Property than that which the Burgesses had, which right was subject to this
easement. Therefore, these subsequent owners, such as Traveller, are similarly barred from
disclaiming the grant of easement.
Although the Burgesses were not identified on the first page of the "Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant" document as "Grantors," the Burgesses did acknowledge that they "warranted" the
conveyance stated within the document, therefore, it is the same. The term "warrant" as used in a

conveyance means both to assure the title to the property sold by an express covenant and that the
title of the grantee shall be good, and the possession undisturbed. Therefore, because the Burgesses
have warranted the conveyance of the easement to Mountain Fuel, Mountain Fuel's possession shall
be undisturbed. Itwas after the Burgesses received title to the Subject Property through the Trustee's
Deed upon sale, and before they transferred their interest to anyone else, that Mountain Fuel recorded
the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant.
There is no dispute raised by Traveller that Berniece Swart, as Trustee, obtained the Subj ect
Property from the Burgesses or that the Burgesses obtained the Subject Property through a trustee's
sale. Those documents evidencing these transfers are not in dispute. Furthermore, the "Right-ofWay and Easement Grant" document shows that Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth Burgess intended
to grant Mountain Fuel and its successors and assigns an easement and right-of-way according to the
terms set forth within the document.
The Utah Supreme Court in Arnold Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133,1f 18, 63 P.3d 721
stated:
We agree with the reasoning of that case but only as it supports validation of a
written attempt to grant an easement. We therefore extend recognition of the
doctrine of estoppel by deed to cover the written easement attempted to be
granted in the instant case. To allow a grantor to deny the terms of its
conveyance after acquiring title by repudiating an easement originally intended
to be granted would be an invitation to fraud and would contravene the central
purpose of the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed.
(Emphasis in original.) Utah law is now clear on the point that a written attempt to grant an
easement is subject to the doctrine of after-acquired title. The Right-of-Way and Easement Grant
in this case is a valid grant of an easement, and the terms of this conveyance cannot now be denied.

in

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the "Right-of-Way and Easement Grant" document

attached to Questar's principal Memorandum as Exhibit "B" and which bears the signatures of
Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess is clear and unambiguous on its face and that at the
time it was so signed, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess im^aii^dixr^mn.t &e easement
and all rights contained therein to Mountain Fuel Supply company, its successors and assigns,
2.

n

The Court further concludes that this specifically forecloses Traveller from

conducting discovery regarding intent of the Burgesses in signing their "Right-of-Way and Easement
Grant" document.
3.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that through the doctrine of after-acquired

title, that within the four corners of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant Rodney C. Burgess and
Elizabeth L. Burgess granted an easement to Mountain Fuel and that the document is a valid
conveyance of the described easement, including all rights and terms specifically contained within
the text of the document; and Traveller is now estopped from disclaiming this conveyance.
4.

The Court concludes that, because Questar has a valid easement, Traveller cannot

maintain an action against Questar to quiet title to the Subject Property in its favor; similarly,
Traveller has no claims against Questar for ejectment for wrongful possession, trespass, nuisance,
or declarative relief regarding the validity of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant.
5.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 is

applicable to this case. Therefore, the Court concludes that because the improvement to the Subject
Property was completed on December 22, 1988, and because Traveller's current claims were filed
on July 26, 2002, such filing was past the deadline for filing. Traveller's Complaint and all causes
11

of action set forth therein, including the argued but unpled claim for quiet title, are all therefore
subject to, and barred by, this statute of [imitations and repose.
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted on both grounds: That it is time-barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-1221.5, and that Defendant has a valid easement across the Subject Property. Plaintiffs Complaint and
all causes of action set forth therein, as well as Plaintiffs argued but unpled cause of action to quiet
title to the Subject Property as to Questar, are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits,
each party to bear its own fees and costs incurred in this matter.
Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this judgment is certified as the final
judgment of all claims raised by the parties.
DATED this

h

day of Ap#, 2003.
BY THE CO

JAMES L. SHUMATE, District Court
Approved as to Form:
Snow, Jensen & Reece
By:
V. Lowry Snow
J. Gregory Hardman
Attorney's for Plaintiff

Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough

attorney's for Defendant
19

NOTICE
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above and foregoing
Order on Summary Judgment Dismissing Complaint With Prejudice and on the Merits to the Fifth
District Court for signature on the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice unless
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration of the State of Utah.

A

DATED this / ^

day of April, 2003.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.

itchell
attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the A S -

day of April, 2003,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true and

correct copy of the foregoing unexecuted ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS to:

V. Lowry Snow
J. Gregory Hardman
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE
134 North 200 East, Suite 302
P.O. Box 2747
St. George, Utah 84771-2747
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
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All rights reserved.
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I I . ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY

• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (2004)
§ 78-12-21.5. Actions related to improvements in real property
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the
improvement for a continuous period of one year.
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors,
omissions, or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design, construction, or
installation of an improvement, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability,
indemnity, contribution, or other source of law.
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an
improvement to real property as established by the earliest of:
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(Hi) the date of first use or possession of the improvement.
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other
similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property.
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint
venture, association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity.
(f) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans,
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys,
staking, construction, and the review, observation, administration, management,
supervision, inspections, and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement.
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(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty
after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates
costs and hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue
and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and
difficulties in defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven
years following completion or abandonment; and
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the
state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes
of action by or against a provider arising out of or related to the design, construction, or
installation of an improvement.
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced
within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. Where an express contract or warranty establishes a different period of
limitations, the action shall be initiated within that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from
the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of
action should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is
discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction, the two-year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider
more than nine years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction.
In the event the cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eighth or ninth year of
the nine-year period, the injured person shall have two additional years from that date to
commence an action.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the
injury, damage, or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty.
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the
periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from
the date the disability is removed to commence the action.
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual
while engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any
person in actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at
the time any defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury
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for which the action is brought.
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by
law or a valid and enforceable contract.
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action.
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003,
notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1;
renumbered by L. 1999, ch. 123, § 1; 2004, ch. 327, § 1.
NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-25.5, as
last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for
injuries due to defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts
the present section.
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as 78-12-25.5, and rewrote the section.
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "seven years" for "ten years" in
Subsection (2)(d); in Subsection (4), substituted "eighth or ninth year" for "eleventh or
twelfth year" and "nine years" for "12 years" twice; in Subsection (11), substituted the years
"2003" and "2004" for "1998" and "1999"; and made two minor stylistic changes.
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78-15-3.
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

±

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
i
Discovery doctrine.

±

Express warranty.

±

Running of statute.

±
Statute of repose.

±

Cited.
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Former seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of
construction, or to his successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing
duty to make repairs, and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim
that the statute was unconstitutional was without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223
(Utah 1974^.
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const,
art. I, § 11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the
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remedy is arbitrary and unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes
& Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989).
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury
was caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts
provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter,
785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989X,
Given the legislative intent in enacting this section, and the remote chance of injury or
damage after a period of years, the statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of
eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under the open courts clause of the state
constitution. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co.f 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
APPLICABILITY.
This statute applies to products liability actions when they relate to improvements in real
property. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
This section merely prescribes certain situations to which the periods of repose do not
apply; it does not purport to set up a substitute remedy. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v.
Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
This section did not bar claim against property developer whose activities involved
determining boundaries, size, location, and placement of lands, as those were not
improvements to the property. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 2003 UT
App 367, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 78 P.3d 995.
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE.
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs
struck a pole on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent,
and there was no injury inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v.
Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987).
EXPRESS WARRANTY.
Without evidence of an express warranty period, let alone one extending beyond six years,
plaintiff was unable to satisfy this section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co.,
1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
RUNNING OF STATUTE.
Plaintiff's slander of title and tortious interference claims against a builder did not accrue
until after the house was sold at a foreclosure sale by the bank, when plaintiff first became
able to demonstrate special damages. Valley Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d
361 (Utah 1997).
STATUTE OF REPOSE.
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it
barred all actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property
for injuries occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions
based on injuries occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that
period. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Fifteen year time between construction of building and collapse of its roof barred a cause of
action because this section acts not as a statute of limitation but as a statute of repose, for
which latency of a defect does not toll the limitation period. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v.
Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
Where a faulty electrical system in an apartment building caused a fire approximately
eighteen years after it was built, this section barred the plaintiffs' action. Olsen v. McMiilen
Elec, 1999 UT 19, 976 P.2d 606.
CITED in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); LichtefeldJk
Cutshaw, 784 P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. —What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49
A.L.R.4th 972.
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or
property caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438.
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Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION * * *
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2004 UT 27, 2004 UT APP 102 * * *
* * * AND APRIL 1, 2004 (FEDERAL CASES) * * *
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES

• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2004)
§ 57-1-10. After-acquired title passes
If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey
the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal
estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or
assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor
at the time of the conveyance.

HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1979; C.L 1917, § 4879; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

±

Conveyance without ownership.

±

— After-acquired interest.

±

— After-acquired title.

±

— Title conveyed.

±

Easements.

±

Cited.
CONVEYANCE WITHOUT OWNERSHIP.
— AFTER-ACQUIRED INTEREST.
Assignment to grantor of rights under an outstanding lease of property at time of
conveyance, after grantor had purported to convey the entire fee of such property by
warranty deed to grantee, gave grantor no rights under the outstanding lease and all such
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rights passed to grantee at time of the assignment. Cox v. Ney, 580 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1978).
- AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE.
Where one who conveyed coal lands subsequently acquired title to lands by patent, afteracquired title inured to grantee. Ketchum v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 257 F. 274 (8th Cir.),
cert, denied, 250 U.S. 668, 40 S. Ct. 14, 63 L. Ed. 1198 (1919), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S.
616, 41 S. Ct. 147, 65 L Ed. 440 (1920).
- TITLE CONVEYED.
Under this section, one who conveys coal lands before he has applied to the government to
purchase the same conveys a good title thereto. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal
Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917).
Where grantor purporting to convey title to mining claims described them in his deed by
name of claim and survey number, he was estopped from making any claim to property
described in deed when he subsequently acquired title thereto. Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 277
F. 55 (8th Cir. 1921).
EASEMENTS.
This section applied to a written easement; the grant of an easement was binding upon the
grantor when it later obtained title after the deed granting the easement was executed.
Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721.
CITED in Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986); Utah Farm Prod.
Credit Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. - 2 3 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds 55 341, 342.
CJ.S. - 2 6 CJ.S. Deeds § 105.
A.L.R. —Property insurance, or public liability insurance, as covering, in absence of express
provision, after-acquired premises or realty, or subsequent additions to described realty, 18
A.LR.3d 795.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION * * *
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2004 UT 27, 2004 UT APP 102 * * *
* * * AND APRIL 1, 2004 (FEDERAL CASES) * * *
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 40. QUIET TITLE

• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 (2004)
§ 78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property — Authorized
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest
in real property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose
of determining such adverse claim.

HISTORY: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-40-1.
NOTES:
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Action brought in county where property situated, § 78-13-1.
Allowance for improvements made under color of title, §§ 57-6-1 et seq., § 78-40-5.
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Limitations of actions, § 78-12-1 et seq.
Tax sales of real property, § 59-2-1303 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

±
Adverse possession.

±
Due process.

±

Heirs.
Judgment.

±

Nature and scope of proceedings.

±
±

Option to purchase.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
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Proof of claim.

±

Tax titles or claims.

±
Water rights.
What claims may be assailed.
What constitutes "claim" of "estate or interest."

±
Wrongful possession.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
One claiming by adverse possession does not arrest the running of this section in his favor
by commencing an action to quiet title. Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 1175 (1911).
DUE PROCESS.
Repossession of real property under a contract and the quiet title procedure did not
constitute state action under the fourteenth amendment, thereby giving the vendees a right
to reasonable notice prior to the destruction of their security interest, where the state did not
create the rights leading to the vendees' deprivation of their interest in the contract. Dirks v.
Goodwill, 754 P.2d 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
HEIRS.
Heirs could bring action to quiet tit'e though there had been no adjudication of heirship.
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355 (1934).
JUDGMENT.
Court of equity, in an action to quiet title, may not only enter judgment quieting title, but
may include in the judgment a general order restraining the defendant from asserting any
claim adverse to, and in derogation of, the plaintiffs right, and may prohibit the defendant
from doing any act that would tend to impair or destroy such right. Richey v. Beus, 31 Utah
262, 87 P. 903 (1906).
Decree in an action to quiet title can only bind the parties to the action. Fisher v. Davis, 77
Utah 81 f 291 P. 493 (1930).
Effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest title, but to perfect an existing title as against
other claimants. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335
(Utah 1979).

NATURE AND SCOPE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The language used in this section is very comprehensive. In terms, it authorizes an action
by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property adverse to
him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. Bullion, Beck & Champion Mining Co.
v.jiureka Hill Mining Co., 5 Utah 3, 11 P. 515 (1886), appeal dismissed, 131 U.S. 431, 9 S.
Ct. 796, 33 L Ed. 224 (1888).
Action to quiet title is an action at law and thus either side, upon request, is entitled to a
jury trial. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958).
Statutory action to quiet title is an action in rem, or quasi in rem, requiring either a state
or federal court to obtain jurisdiction over the property in dispute before proceeding to
adjudication on the merits. 1st Nat'l Credit Corp. v. Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634 (D. Utah
1981).
OPTION TO PURCHASE.
Validly exercised option to purchase cannot fail for the reason that funds are secured from
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a source not contemplated in the option; and, thus, a plaintiff who had placed the purchase
money in escrow and had notified the owner of his intent to exercise the option should have
his title quieted against claims of the assignee of the owner. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 529 P.2d
803 (Utah 1974).
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
In action to quiet title, a plea of the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense with
regard to which the burden of proof was on the defendant. Tate v. Rosef 35 Utah 229 f 99 P.
1003 (1909).
In an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff proved that he was entitled to possession and
that legal title was in him, the law would presume that he was in constructive possession,
and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he was entitled to actual possession. Gibson
v. McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 106 P. 669 (1910).
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the strength of his own
title rather than on the weakness of the defendant's title. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah
10, 94 P.2d 862 (1939); Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon, 112 Utah 13, 184 P.2d 341
(1947).
When the defendant admits the plaintiffs allegation of ownership, but denies his present
ownership, the defendant has the burden of going forward with proof as to the present state
of the title. Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827, 153 A.L.R. 1100
(1944).
In an action to quiet title wherein the plaintiff relies not on record title but upon
possession, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show sufficient facts to justify the trial court
in finding that the plaintiff was in possession. Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon, 112
Utah 13, 184 P.2d 341 (1947).
PROOF OF CLAIM.
I n action to quiet title, it is sufficient if the plaintiff establishes that legal title is in him, and
t h a t the defendants had no right, title, or interest adverse to him in the premises in
controversy; the plaintiff need not be in possession himself. Gibson v. McGurrin, 37 Utah
158, 106 P. 669 (1910).
Plaintiff could prevail on a claim of record title only by showing good title in itself, not by
showing some defects in the title of the defendant. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
Stipulation that land was conveyed to the plaintiff by an insolvent bank through the state
banking commissioner, and that title to the land had previously been quieted in that
commissioner on behalf of the bank and its creditors, was sufficient proof of the fact that the
plaintiff was legal titleholder and as such was presumed to have been in possession of the
land, so as to be entitled to prevail in a suit to quiet title. Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 4 8 1 , 184
P.2d 216 (1947).
Actual possession under a claim of ownership makes out a prima facie case against a
stranger to the title and, unless controverted by one claiming an interest in the property, is
sufficient to justify a decree quieting title in plaintiff. Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon,
112 Utah 13, 184 P.2d 341 (1947).
Plaintiffs made out a prima facie case in a suit to quiet title by introduction in evidence of a
tax title to the land in dispute. Smith v. Nelson, 114 Utah 5 1 , 197 P.2d 132 (1948).
TAX TITLES OR CLAIMS.
The owner who seeks to have a title quieted against a void tax deed must reimburse the
tax title purchaser for all taxes lawfully levied and paid by the tax title purchaser. Reeve v.
Blatchley, 106 Utah 259, 147 P.2d 8 6 1 (1944).
All that a court of equity should require as a condition to quieting title in the owner against
a tax title claimant is that he pay to such claimant the sum advanced by the latter to pay the
taxes less any benefit which he derived from the property supposedly purchased. Reeve v.
Blatchley, 106 Utah 259, 147 P.2d 861 (1944).
Where there was no showing that the county made any representations or that the plaintiff
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relied upon any representations of the county in purchasing a tax deed, the county and its
successors in interest were not estopped from denying the validity of that deed in a suit to
quiet title. Duncan v. Hemmelwriqht, 112 Utah 262, 186 P.2d 965 (1947).
WATER RIGHTS.
An action to quiet title to water rights is in the nature of an action to quiet title to real
estate. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983).
WHAT CLAIMS MAY BE ASSAILED.
Plaintiff in a quiet title action may assail a judgment, deed, or any other instrument
affecting his title, upon the ground of fraud or for any other reason rendering such judgment
or instruments void. If a judgment is assailed in such an action, it is a direct, and not a
collateral, attack. Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 43 Utah 277, 135 P. 103 (1913).

WHAT CONSTITUTES "CLAIM" OF "ESTATE OR INTEREST."
The words "claims an estate or interest" in this section are used in a broad sense, and are
not technical in their meaning. They are evidently intended to embrace every species of
adverse claim set up by a party out of possession. Goldberg v. Taylor, 2 Utah 486 (1880).
WRONGFUL POSSESSION.
In a possessory action the plaintiff must show that at the time of bringing suit the
defendant was wrongfully in possession. Federal Land Bank v. Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 121
P.2d 398 (1942^).
The rule that the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the
weakness of his adversary's title, does not require the plaintiff to exhibit a perfect chain of
title as against one wrongfully in possession. Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah 78, 125 P.2d 413
(1942).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. —65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims 5 7 et seq.
C.J.S. - 2 8 C.J.S. Ejectment § 1 et seq.; 74 C.J.S. Quieting Title § 1 et seq.
A.L.R. —Common source of title doctrine, 5 A.L.R.3d 375.
Measure and amount of damages recoverable under supersedeas bond in action involving
recovery or possession of real estate, 9 A.L.R.3d 330.
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